Indiana Trademark Litigation Update – Coach, Inc. v. Diggz Clothing

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Coach, Inc. et al v. Diggz Clothing LLC et al

Coach strikes again. Coach makes handbags, wallets, etc. Defendant is accused of selling knockoffs from a retail store in Lafayette, Indiana. As always, Coach throws the kitchen sink at the Defendant.

Related case: Coach, Inc. et al v. TJ’s Handbags
Related case: Coach, Inc. et al v. Designer Fragrance & Gifts et al
Related case: Coach Inc. et al v. Tom’s Treasure Chest

Court Case Number: 4:10-cv-00100-JVB -PRC
File Date: Wednesday, December 15, 2010
Plaintiff: Coach, Inc., Coach Services, Inc.
Plaintiff Counsel: Alejandro Valle of Gonzalez Saggio & Harlan LLP
Defendant: Diggz Clothing LLC, Lori Harth
Cause: Trademark Counterfeiting, Trademark Infringement, Trade Dress Infringement, False Designation of Origin and False Advertising, Trademark Dilution, Copyright Infringement, Common Law Trademark Infringement, Common Law Unfair Competition, Forgery under Ind. Code 35-43-5-2(b), Counterfeiting under Ind. Code 35-43-5-2(a)
Court: Northern District of Indiana
Judge: Judge Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
Referred To: Magistrate Judge Paul R. Cherry

Superhero Law Debated on New Blog

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There’s a fun new blog, Law and the Multiverse, that applies real world law to comic book scenarios. In their words:

If there’s one thing comic book nerds like doing it’s over-thinking the smallest details.  Here we turn our attention to the hypothetical legal ramifications of comic book tropes, characters, and powers.  Just a few examples: Are mutants a protected class?  Who foots the bill when a hero damages property while fighting a villain?  What happens legally when a character comes back from the dead?

The blog touches on many different areas of law, including intellectual property. Here is an excerpt:

In the real world comic book characters and their likenesses have been made into toys, video games, movies, television shows, lunchboxes, bed sheets, and innumerable other things. All of these secondary uses are mediated through intellectual property rights, particularly copyright and trademark rights. But if Superman were a real person, how might the situation be different? Could just anyone slap his image or iconic S shield on a lunchbox? What about uses that suggest that Superman endorses a product or service? (“Try Metropolis Brewery Beer, the choice of the Man of Steel!”) Or worse, what about revealing a superhero’s secret identity?

Their latest post explores a favorite topic of the Indiana Intellectual Property Blog, privacy rights:

From a superhero’s point of view, the main issues here are intrusion into his or her secret identity and secret headquarters, if applicable.  The latter case is squarely within the scope of the tort (physical intrusion into a home or office is a classic example of the tort), so let’s focus on the issue of secret identity.  In particular, does a superhero’s secret identity fall under the scope of the second element?  And when we say “reasonable person” do we mean a reasonable regular person or a reasonable superhero, or does it matter?

The answer to the first question is probably yes.  Courts have held that the right to privacy includes psychological & emotional solitude and the intrusion can occur in a public place.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Svcs, Inc., 435 So.2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983) (holding “one’s emotional sanctum is certainly due the same expectations of privacy as one’s physical environment.” and “the ‘wrongful intrusion’ privacy violation can occur in a public place, when the matter intruded upon is of a sufficiently personal nature”).  As the definition states, the intrusion need not be directly physical and can include demands and threats.  Phillips, 435 So.2d at 711.

For the full post and to explore other areas of law, visit Law and the Multiverse.  One of the blog authors is a recent grad of Notre Dame Law School.  I’m looking forward to reading the future posts on copyright and trademark.

Southern District of Indiana swears in new Magistrate

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The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana announced that Mark J. Dinsmore took the oath to become a United States Magistrate Judge on December 17, 2010. Chief Judge Richard L. Young administered the oath in his courtroom in the Birch Bayh Federal Building and United States Courthouse in Indianapolis. A formal investiture ceremony will be held at a later date. The position Judge Dinsmore fills became available due to the elevation of Jane E. Magnus-Stinson to an Article III judgeship, effective June 9, 2010.

Magistrate judges preside over many pretrial proceedings in both civil and criminal cases in federal court, including intellectual property cases. A critical part of the job is conducting mediation and settlement proceedings in civil cases, helping parties settle their disputes by agreement. United States Magistrate Judges are appointed by the Judges of the U.S. District Court for a term of eight years, and are eligible for reappointment to successive terms.

IU Law launches online peer-edited Intellectual Property publication

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Be sure to check out IP Theory, a new peer-edited intellectual property law publication hosted by Indiana University Maurer School of Law’s IP Program.  It is neither law journal nor blog; it is a different sort of publication designed to occupy a niche between the two.

IP Theory is intended to serve as a forum for:

  • essays or opinion pieces that are more concise (and more lightly footnoted) than typical law review articles
  • book reviews
  • reviews of literature – either IP scholarly literature or literature in allied fields

So who’s going to submit an article to IP Theory?

Indiana Court of Appeals Rules on Jury Access to Digital Evidence

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The Indiana Court of Appeals recently overturned a jury verdict because the trial court did not provide the jury with the ability to examine digital evidence during its deliberations in Arlton v. Schraut, Cause No. 79A02-0906-CV-541. The court’s ruling is likely to be an important decision governing how digital evidence is to be made accessible to juries in the future.

Key exhibits at the trial were three CD-ROMs containing a series of digital photos, called angiograms, which showed the back of Arlton’s left eye before and after laser surgery on the retina. During testimony from various witnesses, both parties showed the jury enlarged images of the angiograms using the CD-ROM discs, a projector and a screen. But the trial court did not provide the CD-ROMs to the jury to examine during deliberations.

The Indiana Court of Appeals held that the jury should have been allowed to view the CD-ROM discs during deliberations:

“We do not presume to set forth one all-encompassing rule regarding providing the jury access to digital evidence. The solutions could be as simple as … transforming the evidence into a medium that is accessible without a computer. Or the court or parties could provide the jury with a ‘clean’ computer, i.e., one that contains no other information and which has no ability to access the Internet…. But whatever solution is agreed upon or decided upon is better than admitting digital evidence, and then giving the jurors no means of accessing it. Digital evidence should not be relegated to muteness.”

Source: ComputerUser